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3 South Penn Square 
Philadelphia, PA 19107 
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____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
Anthony Brown was convicted in Pennsylvania state 
court of first-degree murder, reckless endangerment, and 
possession of an instrument of crime.  After exhausting his 
state court remedies, Brown filed a federal habeas petition 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), claiming that the decision 
of the Pennsylvania Superior Court was an unreasonable 
application of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania granted Brown‘s petition following an 
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evidentiary hearing.  The Commonwealth appeals, claiming 
that under the stringent requirements of the Anti-Terrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Brown 
was entitled to neither a federal evidentiary hearing nor the 
issuance of the writ. 
I 
A 
On September 7, 1998, the Rorie family attended a 
Labor Day celebration at the 600 block of Conestoga Street in 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  As the block party ended 
sometime after 8:00 p.m., the matriarch of the family, Frances 
Rorie, began to sweep the sidewalk while thirty others 
cleaned.  Suddenly, Tiffany Thompson ran toward the crowd 
yelling ―they‘re coming, they got a gun.‖  A vehicle rounded 
the corner of Poplar and Conestoga Streets, and four men 
emerged from the car.  One man fired a gunshot into the air.  
As Frances Rorie tried to find shelter behind a car, a second 
shooter pointed an Uzi pistol at the Rorie home and fired 
seventeen shots into the crowd.  One shot hit Frances in the 
head, killing her instantly. 
Frances Rorie‘s murder capped a day of heated 
confrontation between neighbors.  The trouble began in the 
morning, when children from Conestoga Street argued with 
children from Girard Avenue.  The mother of some of the 
Girard Avenue children was Kim Brown, sister of Appellee 
Anthony Brown.  Accompanied by her friend, Sharon Carter, 
Kim approached Frances‘s granddaughter, Tamika 
Thompson, who referred the women to her mother, Alanda 
Rorie, at 647 Conestoga Street.  There, Kim and Sharon 
argued with Alanda, Frances, and Yvonne Rorie. 
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The argument at Alanda Rorie‘s home did not relieve 
the tensions between the families.  Sometime between 3:00 
and 4:00 p.m., Kim Brown‘s son Hakim threw a rock at 
Yvonne Rorie‘s son Rafeek.  The Rories then grabbed 
brooms and marched to the corner of Conestoga and Girard.  
The Browns in turn wielded knives while their friend, 
Kareema Latimer, threatened to ―get her .357 and spray the 
whole corner.‖  A few hours after Latimer issued her threat, 
Tamika and Yvonne spotted Appellee Anthony Brown, 
Anthony Fingers, Kevin Johnson, and two other men standing 
at the corner with Kareema Latimer, who pointed at the Rorie 
home. 
According to Yvonne Rorie, the shooting started 
fifteen to twenty minutes later.  Tamika Thompson later 
testified that she did not know precisely how much time 
elapsed, but knew it was more than five minutes later.  A 
police radio call reported the shooting at 8:23 or 8:24 p.m. 
When police arrived, Tamika and Yvonne reported 
that they had seen the men standing at the corner, that at least 
two of them had guns, and that one had pointed a gun at the 
Rorie home before he started shooting.  Tamika described the 
assailant as tall, light-skinned, skinny, and about 22 years-old.  
She said he was wearing a blue cap with a red brim, a white 
shirt, and blue jean shorts, and driving a four-door gray car.  
Yvonne described the shooter as tall, light-skinned, and 
wearing a white shirt, blue or black shorts, and a white 
baseball cap.  Yvonne also identified the shooter as Anthony 
Brown.  Three days later, both Tamika and Yvonne picked 
Anthony Brown out of a photo array.  At trial, Tamika again 
identified Anthony Brown as one of the shooters. 
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Tiffany Thompson, who saw the gunmen approaching, 
told police the shooter lived at 5408 Girard Avenue.  The 
police promptly executed a search warrant for that address 
and discovered some clothing matching the descriptions 
Tamika and Yvonne had provided, including a white shirt, 
dark blue jean shorts, brown boots, and an Atlanta Braves 
cap.  They also found a photo of Anthony Brown wearing the 
same clothes, his mail, and a traffic citation issued on the day 
of the shooting.  A warrant issued for Brown‘s arrest, and he 
surrendered later that week. 
B 
At trial, Brown presented a misidentification defense 
and an alibi defense.  His misidentification defense relied on 
the testimony of Frances Rorie‘s grandson, Gary Jones, and 
Rorie‘s daughter, Timmsel. 
Contrary to the testimony of Tamika Thompson and 
Yvonne Rorie, Gary Jones testified on direct examination that 
the shooter was short, dark-skinned, and wearing a plaid shirt, 
blue shorts, black Timberland boots, and a red and blue 
Atlanta Braves cap.  He described another man (not the 
shooter) as a light-skinned, bald, mustachioed man, who wore 
a tee-shirt, blue shorts, and Reebok sneakers.  On cross-
examination, the prosecution impeached Jones with his prior 
statement to police, which was not only contrary to his 
testimony on direct examination, but also similar to the 
descriptions given by Tamika Thompson and Yvonne Rorie 
shortly after the shooting.  In that statement, Jones described 
the shooter as tall and light-skinned, wearing an Atlanta 
Braves cap, light blue shorts, a white shirt, and black boots. 
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Timmsel Rorie testified on direct examination that she 
initially described the shooter to police as tall, light-skinned, 
and wearing a red plaid shirt.  She identified another man (not 
the shooter) as a tall, light-skinned man of 18 or 19, wearing a 
white shirt and long blue jeans.  According to Timmsel, that 
man was Anthony Brown.  On cross-examination, the 
prosecution impeached Timmsel with the fact that just days 
after the shooting she identified Anthony Brown as the 
shooter.  Moreover, Timmsel eventually made an in-court 
identification of Anthony Brown as the shooter and testified 
that she did not correct her initial misstatement to the police 
because she wanted her boyfriend to kill Brown to avenge her 
mother‘s murder. 
Brown‘s alibi defense relied on the testimony of 
Lynnette Bright, who was the college roommate of Brown‘s 
cousin, Tiyana Miller.  According to Bright, she and Miller 
went to a TGI Friday‘s restaurant at 17th Street and Benjamin 
Franklin Parkway to buy take-out food at approximately 7:30 
p.m. on the night of the shooting.  Bright testified that about 
fifteen minutes after they arrived, Miller noticed Anthony 
Brown walking toward the front of the restaurant.  Miller and 
Brown spoke for a few minutes before Brown returned to his 
table.  Bright testified that she and Miller were seated near the 
front door of the restaurant, that they waited a long time to get 
their food, and that they left between 8:15 and 8:20 p.m.  
Bright stated that she never saw Brown leave. 
On cross-examination, Bright admitted that she knew 
several of Brown‘s relatives.  She was impeached with 
inconsistent statements regarding the time she arrived at the 
restaurant, as well as with her failure to cooperate with the 
District Attorney‘s investigation.  Bright also was unable to 
describe what Brown was wearing at the restaurant.  Finally, 
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Bright eventually admitted that she lied to a defense 
investigator when she told him that she saw Brown eating 
with his friends when she left the restaurant and she never 
saw Brown seated at his table. 
Brown‘s cousin Tiyana Miller corroborated Bright‘s 
testimony that they went to the TGI Friday‘s between 7:15 
and 7:30 p.m.  According to Miller, it already was dark when 
they left for the restaurant, and they waited fifteen to twenty 
minutes before placing their order.  While they waited, Miller 
saw Brown emerge from the dining area to use the phone,
1
 
and she chatted with him.  Miller testified that she and Bright 
waited about an hour for their food and left at approximately 
8:20 p.m.  She stated that when she left, Brown still was 
seated with Anthony Fingers, Kevin Johnson, and two 
women. 
Miller was impeached with evidence that after the 
shooting she returned to the restaurant to ask if they had a 
video surveillance system that could pinpoint when Brown 
left on the night of the murder.  Her testimony was also 
undermined because she neither contacted family members to 
advise them that she had seen Brown that night, nor contacted 
the police with her information or responded to letters from 
the District Attorney.  Finally, like Bright, she could not 
describe what Brown was wearing at the restaurant. 
Kevin Johnson, who allegedly accompanied Brown to 
the restaurant, also testified for the defense.  According to 
                                                 
1
 Kim Brown had called her brother, Anthony Brown, 
and he returned her call from a payphone at the restaurant.  
Kevin Johnson later testified that Brown told him the phone 
call concerned the dispute at Conestoga and Girard. 
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Johnson, they arrived at TGI Friday‘s before 7:00 p.m., while 
it was still daylight, and left after it was dark.  He testified 
that they were seated on the second floor, not in the bar area 
where Bright and Miller could have seen them. 
Finally, Brown testified in his own defense.  Brown 
told the jury that on the day of the murder, he was driving to a 
different TGI Friday‘s when he received a traffic citation, 
which lists the time of the stop as 6:41 p.m.  Brown gave the 
officer an alias and an incorrect address because he often 
violated traffic laws and feared being arrested.  According to 
Brown, he arrived at the first TGI Friday‘s with Kevin 
Johnson, Anthony Fingers, and three women they met that 
afternoon, but it was crowded, so they decided to go to the 
TGI Friday‘s on the Parkway instead, arriving at 
approximately 7:10 to 7:15 p.m.  After they were seated, 
Brown saw Miller and Bright near the door.  He talked to 
them before his food arrived and eventually left the restaurant 
at 8:45 p.m.
2
 
Brown testified that after leaving the restaurant, he, 
Anthony Fingers, and Kevin Johnson drove to Johnson‘s 
automotive detail shop at 59th and Race Streets, where they 
spent about ten minutes.  Brown claimed they then drove 
home to Girard Avenue, where he found police already 
gathered. 
 
                                                 
2
 Although Brown later conceded on collateral review 
that he was given a receipt for his bill at TGI Friday‘s, he 
never offered it into evidence to corroborate when he left the 
restaurant. 
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C 
Brown was represented at trial by attorney Tariq El 
Shabazz.  When El Shabazz rose to call the defense‘s alibi 
witnesses, the prosecution objected because El Shabazz had 
failed to file a notice of alibi as required under Pennsylvania 
law.  See Pa. R. Crim. P. 567.  El Shabazz initially claimed 
that he had filed the notice, but later admitted that he had not.  
Notwithstanding El Shabazz‘s failure to file a notice of alibi, 
the trial court allowed Bright, Miller, and Johnson to testify 
because the prosecution had received written statements from 
them.  But the trial court excluded two alibi witnesses who 
worked at TGI Friday‘s: manager Andre Osborne and 
waitress Stacy Szmyt. 
The jury convicted Brown of all charges.  After his 
post-trial motions were denied, Brown raised several issues 
on direct appeal, including that counsel was ineffective for 
failing to file a notice of alibi.  The Superior Court dismissed 
the claims without prejudice to Brown‘s right to raise them on 
collateral review.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
subsequently denied Brown‘s petition for allowance of 
appeal. 
D 
Brown filed a petition for collateral review under 
Pennsylvania‘s Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), raising 
the same issues he raised on direct appeal.  Brown later filed a 
supplement to the petition, arguing for the first time that his 
counsel was ineffective for failing to present the testimony of 
Malik Easley, an alleged eyewitness to the shooting. 
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Attached to Brown‘s PCRA petition were two witness 
statements and three affidavits further supporting his alibi.  
The witness statements were from the two witnesses who had 
not been permitted to testify at trial:  Andre Osborne and 
Stacy Szmyt.  Osborne confirmed he was a manager at TGI 
Friday‘s on the night of the shooting and that he saw Brown 
with two other men and some women at Table 307.  Osborne 
stated that he remembered them because they were loud and 
because he suspected they might not pay their bill.  Osborne 
was unsure what time the group left but remembered that the 
sun had already set.  Szmyt stated that she waited on Table 
307 that night and vaguely remembered serving a rowdy 
group.  She offered no information about when the group 
departed. 
The three affidavits supported Brown‘s claim that his 
counsel was ineffective.  Brown‘s father, Arthur Boyer, 
attested that he told El Shabazz several times prior to trial that 
alibi witnesses were available and asked if El Shabazz had 
interviewed the waitress at the restaurant.  El Shabazz replied 
that he was ―working on it.‖  In a second affidavit, Brown 
claimed he informed El Shabazz of his alibi, gave him the 
names of his dinner companions, and told him their waitress‘s 
name was Stacy.  Brown claimed that El Shabazz: (1) never 
interviewed any of the diners; (2) hired an investigator to 
locate witnesses but failed to pay the fee; and (3) hired a new 
investigator only on the eve of trial.  The new investigator, 
Brian Grevious, stated in an affidavit that he was retained 
three days prior to trial and that he located Osborne and 
Szmyt and took their statements. 
The PCRA court dismissed Brown‘s petition for 
collateral relief.  Commonwealth v. Brown, C.P. 9810–0366, 
at *1 (Pa. Comm. Pleas Ct. June 6, 2008).  Citing both 
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Strickland v. Washington and state law precedents, the court 
rejected Brown‘s ineffective assistance claim.  Id. at *5–17.  
The court reasoned that El Shabazz‘s performance was not 
deficient because he did not learn of the two alibi witnesses 
until the sixth day of trial.  Id. at *7.  The court also 
concluded that the absence of Osborne‘s and Szmyt‘s 
testimony did not prejudice Brown because, even assuming 
its relevancy, it would have been ―cumulative‖ and 
―unnecessary.‖  Id. at *8. 
Brown appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, 
which affirmed.  Commonwealth v. Brown, No. 2271 EDA 
2005, at *1 (Pa. Super. Ct. Apr. 9, 2009).  The Superior Court 
reasoned that Brown had failed to show that the alibi 
witnesses were available to testify at trial.  Id. at *10–11.  
Alternatively, the Superior Court concluded that even had El 
Shabazz been aware of the witnesses, their testimony would 
have been ―merely cumulative.‖   Id. at *12. 
While Brown‘s appeal was pending in the Superior 
Court, he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania.  Following the Superior Court‘s affirmance, the 
Magistrate Judge conducted an evidentiary hearing regarding 
Brown‘s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
The evidentiary hearing revealed that although he had 
hired an investigator, El Shabazz never received any 
information because he failed to pay the bill.  Brown v. 
Wakefield, No. 07-1098, 2010 WL 2606443, at *12 (E.D. Pa. 
Jan. 28, 2010).  El Shabazz then hired Grevious ―less than 
one week prior to the start of trial.‖  Id. at *9.  The night 
before El Shabazz brought Szmyt and Osborne to court, 
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Grevious informed El Shabazz that he had found them and 
they were ―ready and willing to testify.‖  Id. 
Osborne‘s and Szmyt‘s testimony at the federal 
evidentiary hearing added little to the witness statements they 
had submitted to the state courts.  Osborne remembered that 
he was worried that Brown and his party might not pay their 
bill, that they eventually paid, and that it was ―dark‖ when 
they left.  Id. at *9–10.  Szmyt reaffirmed that her prior 
statements were her true recollections of the events of that 
night, but she could ―not really‖ recall the events by the time 
of the hearing. 
El Shabazz testified that he failed to submit a notice of 
alibi for Osborne and Szmyt, as well as for an additional 
witness, Malik Easley.  Id. at *12.  El Shabazz stated that he 
would not have called Easley to testify because of strategic 
concerns,
3
 but admitted that his failure to file a notice for 
Szmyt and Osborne impaired his defense of Brown.  Id. 
The Commonwealth also submitted evidence at the 
hearing.  Philadelphia Police Detective John McDermott 
stated that he had driven the route from TGI Friday‘s to the 
corner of Conestoga and Girard and that the trip took twenty-
one minutes in moderate traffic.  Id. at *13.  A diversion to 
                                                 
3
 If called at trial, Easley would have testified that he 
was present during the murder and that, although he did not 
clearly see the shooting, he knew Brown was not the 
assailant.  Id. at *10.  El Shabazz testified he would not have 
called Easley because his testimony would have corroborated 
some details of the descriptions of the shooter given by 
prosecution witnesses and would have placed a car similar to 
Brown‘s at the scene. Id. 
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Johnson‘s auto shop added only one or two minutes.  Id.  
Using an almanac, Detective McDermott testified that the sun 
set on September 7, 1998, at 7:23 p.m. and that the end of 
―civil twilight‖ was 7:50 p.m.  Id. 
The Magistrate Judge recommended granting Brown‘s 
petition.  According to the Magistrate Judge, El Shabazz‘s 
mistakes prejudiced Brown because the ―evidence of guilt 
was hardly overwhelming,‖ no murder weapon was ever 
found, and descriptions of the assailant were inconsistent.  Id. 
at *15.  He also noted that Osborne would have been the only 
disinterested witness to testify that Brown left the restaurant 
when it was ―dark,‖ which would have corroborated Bright‘s 
and Miller‘s testimony that Brown left the restaurant too late 
to be the shooter.  Id. 
The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge‘s 
recommendation and granted Brown‘s petition, largely 
because it agreed that Osborne‘s testimony corroborated 
Brown‘s alibi.  Brown v. Wakefield, No. 07-1098, 2010 WL 
2596900, at *10 (E.D. Pa. June 24, 2010).  Noting that the 
sun set at 7:23 p.m. and the end of civil twilight was 7:50 
p.m., the District Court concluded that Osborne‘s testimony 
that Brown left TGI Friday‘s when it was ―dark‖ placed 
Brown at the restaurant at least sometime between 7:23 and 
7:50 p.m.  Id.  Because Yvonne Rorie testified that she saw 
Kareema Latimer meet with Brown fifteen to twenty minutes 
before the shooting, the District Court concluded that Brown 
would have had to be at the scene at about 8:00 p.m.  Id.  
Brown testified that it took him fifteen minutes to drive to the 
auto shop and that he spent ten minutes there.  And Detective 
McDermott testified at the evidentiary hearing that a similar 
trip took twenty-one minutes.  Id. at *11.  Based on that 
testimony, the District Court reasoned that ―a jury could have 
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concluded from Osborne‘s testimony, had it been presented at 
trial, that [Brown] did not leave until twilight had ended, 7:50 
p.m., a time when [Brown] would likely have been unable to 
reach the scene of the crime in sufficient time to meet with 
Kareema Latimer.‖  Id.  Moreover, Osborne‘s statement that 
Brown left when it was ―dark‖ corroborated Miller‘s, 
Bright‘s, and Brown‘s testimony that Brown left after 8:15 
p.m.  Id. 
The District Court did not adopt the Magistrate 
Judge‘s finding that Osborne had recalled Brown leaving 
when it was ―nighttime, not just twilight,‖ because Osborne 
testified only that it was ―definitely dark outside.‖  Id.  The 
District Court also declined to adopt the Magistrate Judge‘s 
conclusion that El Shabazz was aware of alibi witnesses 
before the trial started.  Id.  This disagreement between the 
Magistrate Judge and the District Court was immaterial, 
however, because El Shabazz should have been aware of the 
witnesses.  Id. at *12–13.  Finally, the District Court adopted 
the conclusion that Osborne and Szmyt were ―ready and 
willing to testify,‖ based on the hearing testimony of El 
Shabazz, Grevious, Osborne, and Szmyt.  Id. at *13. 
In light of these factual findings, the District Court 
held that ―the PCRA court‘s application of Strickland, and the 
Superior Court‘s affirmance, [were] unreasonable.‖  Id. at 
*14.  In doing so, the Court reached two overarching 
conclusions.  First, the state courts applied the wrong standard 
for determining whether El Shabazz was ineffective because 
they did not sufficiently consider whether he conducted a 
diligent investigation into possible alibis for Brown.  Id. at 
*14–16.  Second, the state courts unreasonably concluded that 
Brown was not prejudiced by his counsel‘s mistakes.  The 
state courts failed to properly consider whether there was a 
 15 
 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel‘s unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceedings would have been 
different.  Such a probability existed, according to the District 
Court, because Osborne was a disinterested witness who 
―would have bolstered the credibility of the petitioner and 
other alibi witnesses.‖  Id. at *17.  Regarding Osborne‘s 
testimony that it was ―dark‖ when Brown left the restaurant, 
the Court wrote: ―while not definitely proving that [Brown] 
could not have been at the scene of the crime . . . [it] puts into 
serious question whether [Brown] had enough time to make it 
. . . to the scene of the shooting . . . .‖  Id.  The District Court 
also concluded that the state courts incorrectly regarded 
Osborne‘s and Szmyt‘s testimony as ―cumulative.‖  Id. at 
*18.  According to the Court, ―where defense witnesses 
[were] impeached for having a close relationship to [Brown], 
and prosecution eyewitnesses had a conflict with [Brown‘s] 
family, the existence of disinterested witnesses corroborating 
[Brown‘s] alibi could weigh heavily in the jury‘s decision of 
which set of witnesses to credit.‖  Id.  Therefore, ―a 
reasonable probability exist[ed] that, if the jury had heard 
Osborne‘s testimony, the jury would have found reasonable 
doubt.‖  Id. 
The Commonwealth raises two issues on appeal.  First, 
it claims the District Court erred when it held an evidentiary 
hearing because Brown was not diligent in developing the 
factual record in state court.  Second, it argues the District 
Court erred when it concluded that the state courts 
unreasonably applied federal law in denying Brown‘s 
petition. 
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II 
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254(a).  Our jurisdiction 
lies under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a). 
―We have plenary review over the District Court‘s 
grant of habeas corpus.‖  Washington v. Sobina, 509 F.3d 
613, 618–19 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Rolan v. Vaughn, 445 F.3d 
671, 577 (3d Cir. 2006)).  ―Accordingly, we will ‗review the 
state courts‘ determinations under the same standard that the 
District Court was required to apply,‘‖ which are the 
standards set forth in AEDPA.  Lewis v. Horn, 581 F.3d 92, 
100 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Thomas v. Horn, 570 F.3d 105, 
113 (3d Cir. 2009)). 
A federal court may not grant habeas relief to a person 
in state custody whose claims were adjudicated on the merits 
unless that adjudication: 
(1) resulted in a decision that was 
contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, 
clearly established Federal law, as 
determined by the Supreme Court 
of the United States; or 
(2) resulted in a decision that was 
based on an unreasonable 
determination of the facts in light 
of the evidence presented in the 
State court proceeding. 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 
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III 
 As a threshold matter, the Commonwealth claims the 
District Court should not have granted Brown an evidentiary 
hearing.  We agree based on Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 
1388 (2011), which the Supreme Court decided after the 
District Court ruled in this case.  In Pinholster, the Supreme 
Court explained that:  ―review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited 
to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated 
the claim on the merits.‖  Id. at 1398. 
Because we find Pinholster controlling, we review it in 
some detail.  Pinholster was convicted in California state 
court of first-degree murder and sentenced to death.  He 
sought post-conviction relief, claiming his counsel was 
ineffective at the penalty phase by failing to investigate or 
present mitigating evidence, including evidence that 
Pinholster suffered from mental disorders.  Id. at 1396.  The 
psychiatrist Pinholster‘s counsel consulted before trial, Dr. 
Stalberg, concluded that Pinholster did not suffer from a 
mental disorder.  Not surprisingly, Dr. Stalberg was not called 
to testify at Pinholster‘s trial.  Id.  On collateral review, 
Pinholster supported his ineffective assistance claim with 
academic, medical, and legal records, as well as declarations 
from family members, one of his trial attorneys, and a 
psychiatrist, all of which suggested Pinholster suffered from 
bipolar mood and seizure disorders.  Id.  Pinholster‘s petition 
was denied.  Id. 
Pinholster filed a federal habeas petition in which he 
reiterated his ineffective assistance claim and added new 
allegations that his counsel failed to provide Dr. Stalberg with 
enough information to make an accurate report.  Id.  In 
support of Pinholster‘s new allegations, Dr. Stalberg declared 
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that had he known of evidence gathered after trial, he would 
have conducted ―further inquiry‖ before concluding that 
Pinholster did not suffer from a mental disorder.  Id. 
The federal district court granted Pinholster an 
evidentiary hearing.  Id.  Before the hearing, however, Dr. 
Stalberg averred that the new evidence did not change his 
diagnosis.  Id. at 1397.  Consequently, Pinholster did not call 
him to testify at the hearing, opting instead for new experts 
whose testimony would be more favorable to him.  Id.  The 
state also offered evidence at the federal evidentiary hearing, 
calling a psychiatrist who denied that Pinholster suffered 
from a mental disorder.  Id.  The district court granted 
Pinholster habeas relief, and the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit ultimately affirmed in an en banc opinion.  See 
Pinholster v. Ayers, 590 F.3d 651 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).  
After considering evidence from the evidentiary hearing, the 
Ninth Circuit concluded that the California Supreme Court 
had unreasonably applied Strickland.  Id. at 666–84. 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that ―[i]f a claim 
has been adjudicated on the merits by a state court, a federal 
habeas petition[er] must overcome the limitation of 
§ 2254(d)(1) on the record that was before that state court.‖  
Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1400 (footnote omitted).  The Court 
reasoned that the purpose of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is ―to channel 
prisoners‘ claims first to the state courts‖ and that ―[i]t would 
be contrary to that purpose to allow a petitioner to overcome 
an adverse state-court decision with new evidence introduced 
in a federal habeas court and reviewed by that court in the 
first instance effectively de novo.‖  Id. at 1398–99.  The Court 
was puzzled by ―the notion that a state court can be deemed 
to have unreasonably applied federal law to evidence it did 
not even know existed.‖  Id. at 1399 n.3. 
 19 
 
In light of Pinholster, district courts cannot conduct 
evidentiary hearings to supplement the existing state court 
record under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).  Otherwise, federal habeas 
petitioners would be able to circumvent the finality of state 
court judgments by establishing a new factual record.  This 
would contravene AEDPA, which requires petitioners to 
diligently present the facts in state court before proceeding to 
the federal courthouse.  As the Supreme Court reaffirmed: 
―Federal courts sitting in habeas are not an alternative forum 
for trying facts and issues which a prisoner made insufficient 
effort to pursue in state court proceedings.‖  Pinholster, 131 
S. Ct. at 1401 (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 437 
(2000)). 
As in Pinholster, here Brown‘s state petition for post-
conviction relief was denied on the merits, and he sought 
federal relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).  Like Pinholster, 
Brown sought to supplement the record with evidence he 
never presented to the state courts.  The Magistrate Judge 
conducted an evidentiary hearing to explore Brown‘s 
ineffective assistance claim, which essentially resulted in a de 
novo trial, as both sides marshaled new evidence for the 
federal hearing.  This was contrary to AEDPA, which obliged 
the District Court to base its review only on the evidence 
Brown presented in state court.  Therefore, we hold that the 
District Court erred in conducting an evidentiary hearing.
4
 
                                                 
4
 Although the parties‘ arguments regarding the 
propriety of the federal evidentiary hearing focus on 28 
U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), Pinholster renders that provision 
inapplicable to this case.  When a prisoner has ―failed to 
develop the factual basis of a claim in State court 
proceedings,‖ § 2254(e)(2) bars a federal court from holding 
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IV 
 Having determined that the federal evidentiary hearing 
was improper, we consider Brown‘s habeas petition in light 
of the record he made in the Pennsylvania courts. 
Brown claims the denial of his petition involved an 
―unreasonable application of[] clearly established Federal 
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 
                                                                                                             
an evidentiary hearing unless certain statutory requirements 
are met.  Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1400 n.4. 
Prior to AEDPA, ―the decision to grant an evidentiary 
hearing was generally left to the sound discretion of district 
courts.‖  Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007) 
(citing Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 463–64 (1953), and 
Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 313 (1963)).  ―AEDPA, 
however, changed the standards for granting federal habeas 
relief.‖  Id. at 473.  Accordingly, we previously recognized 
that so long as a petitioner does not run afoul of § 2254(e)(2), 
―the district court [is] permitted under the AEDPA, though 
not required, to grant an evidentiary hearing.‖  Goldblum v. 
Klem, 510 F.3d 204, 220–21 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Campbell 
v. Vaughn, 209 F.3d 280, 286–87 (3d Cir. 2000)).  This is no 
longer the case in light of Pinholster and our holding today. 
Although it speaks directly to the unavailability of 
evidentiary hearings to adjudicate claims brought under § 
2254(d), the exact scope of § 2254(e)(2) is unclear after 
Pinholster.  See Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1401 n.8 (―We see 
no need in this case to address the proper application of § 
2254(e)(2).‖).  It is clear, however, that our jurisprudence 
applying § 2254(e)(2) remains applicable ―where § 
2254(d)(1) does not bar federal habeas relief.‖  Id. at 1401. 
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States.‖  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).  Specifically, he contends it 
was unreasonable for the Superior Court to conclude that El 
Shabazz‘s failure to develop an alibi defense did not warrant 
a new trial based on Strickland.  We disagree. 
In determining whether a state court unreasonably 
applied federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), ―a habeas 
court must determine what arguments or theories supported or 
. . . could have supported, the state court‘s decision; and then 
it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could 
disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with 
the holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme Court].‖  
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011).  The 
question is not whether the state court‘s holding was wrong, 
but whether it was reasonable.  Indeed, ―even a strong case 
for relief does not mean the state court‘s contrary conclusion 
was unreasonable.‖  Id. (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 
63, 75 (2003)). 
There is no dispute here as to the relevant clearly 
established law.  Under Strickland‘s familiar two-part test, we 
consider whether counsel‘s performance was deficient and, if 
so, whether it prejudiced Brown.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.  
―The standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both 
‗highly deferential,‘ and when the two apply in tandem, the 
review is ‗doubly so.‘‖  Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 788 
(citations omitted).  Accordingly, we are ―not authorized to 
grant habeas corpus relief simply because we disagree with 
the state court‘s decision or because we would have reached a 
different result if left to our own devices.‖  Werts v. Vaughn, 
228 F.3d 178, 197 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Matteo v. 
Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 F.3d 877, 889 (3d Cir. 
1999)).  The question is ―whether there is any reasonable 
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argument that counsel satisfied Strickland‘s deferential 
standard.‖  Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 788. 
The Commonwealth has not challenged the District 
Court‘s holding that El Shabazz was deficient, so we will 
consider only whether his mistakes prejudiced Brown.  To 
demonstrate prejudice, Brown must establish ―a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel‘s unprofessional errors, the 
result in the proceeding would have been different.‖  
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  He ―need not show that 
counsel‘s deficient performance ‗more likely than not altered 
the outcome of the case‘—rather, he must show only ‗a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome.‘‖  Jacobs v. Horn, 395 F.3d 92, 105 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693–94).  On the other hand, 
it is not enough ―to show that the errors had some conceivable 
effect on the outcome of the proceeding.‖  Harrington, 131 S. 
Ct. at 787 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693).  Counsel‘s 
errors must be ―so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair 
trial.‖  Id. at 787–88 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).  The 
likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just 
conceivable.  Id. 
Anthony Brown has not shown that his counsel‘s 
failure to develop an alibi defense prejudiced his trial.  Unlike 
many criminal prosecutions, the case against Brown was not 
based on circumstantial evidence.  Tamika Thompson, 
Timmsel Rorie, and Yvonne Rorie all witnessed the murder 
and picked Brown out of a photo array.  Tamika and Timmsel 
testified at trial that Brown was the assailant.  Just minutes 
after the shooting, Tamika and Yvonne gave similar 
descriptions of the assailant to police, and those descriptions 
matched Brown‘s appearance.  Tiffany Thompson, who saw 
the men approaching, told police that the shooter lived at 
 23 
 
5408 Girard Avenue, where officers recovered clothing 
matching the descriptions given by Tamika and Yvonne, 
along with a photograph of Brown wearing those clothes, 
Brown‘s mail, and the traffic citation that Brown had received 
en route to TGI Friday‘s on the night of the shooting.  Tamika 
also told police that the shooter drove a four-door gray car, a 
description matching Brown‘s automobile.  Tamika also 
rebutted Brown‘s alibi by placing his car at Conestoga and 
Girard at the time of the murder, rather than at TGI Friday‘s 
or the auto shop. 
In addition to physical evidence and eyewitness 
testimony, the prosecution presented a strong motive for the 
crime.  The day of the murder, Brown‘s sister Kim was 
involved in a heated feud with the victim and her family.  A 
Brown family friend, Kareema Latimer, had previously 
threatened to ―spray the whole corner,‖ and she was seen, just 
minutes before the murder, pointing out the Rorie home to 
Anthony Brown and four other men.  Kevin Johnson testified 
that Kim Brown paged her brother Anthony at TGI Friday‘s 
to talk about the dispute between the Rories of Conestoga 
Street and the Browns of Girard Avenue, and Lynnette Bright 
and Tiyana Miller claimed to have seen Brown emerge from 
the restaurant to return that call on a pay phone.  Although the 
timeline is inexact, the shooting occurred less than an hour 
later.  Based on this evidence, the jury reasonably could have 
concluded that Anthony Brown killed Frances Rorie in 
retaliation for the dispute between the Rories and the Browns. 
Nor would the excluded alibi witnesses, Osborne and 
Szmyt, have rebutted the prosecution‘s case.  In their witness 
statements submitted to the PCRA court, Osborne and Szmyt 
merely recalled that Brown was at TGI Friday‘s on the 
evening of the murder, a fact the prosecution conceded 
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throughout the trial.  Neither Osborne nor Szmyt remembered 
when Brown departed the restaurant, and Osborne could say 
only that the sun had set.  The murder occurred shortly before 
8:24 p.m., and Brown was seen conferring with Kareema 
Latimer five to twenty minutes earlier, so Osborne‘s and 
Szmyt‘s statements were consistent with the prosecution‘s 
theory of the case.  A jury could have determined that Brown 
left the restaurant sometime after it appeared to Osborne that 
the sun had set and still had time to meet with Kareema 
Latimer shortly after 8:00 p.m. before opening fire around 
8:23 p.m.  Based on this timeline, it was not unreasonable for 
the Pennsylvania Superior Court to conclude that there was 
no prejudice under Strickland because the excluded testimony 
would have been ―merely cumulative.‖ 
V 
Even if the federal evidentiary hearing had been 
proper, we would hold that El Shabazz‘s deficient 
performance did not prejudice Brown.  In holding otherwise, 
the District Court‘s ―lengthy opinion . . . discloses an 
improper understanding of § 2254(d)‘s unreasonableness 
standard and of its operation in the context of a Strickland 
claim.‖  Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 785. 
The evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing 
added little to Brown‘s defense.  The only addition to 
Osborne‘s prior statement in state court was his recollection 
that it was ―dark‖ when Brown left the restaurant.  This vague 
description is consistent with his prior testimony that the sun 
had set.  Similarly, Szmyt testified only that her prior 
statement was an accurate recollection.  Thus, Osborne‘s and 
Szmyt‘s hearing testimony merely confirmed their state court 
testimony. 
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Ironically, the Commonwealth presented the evidence 
the District Court found most helpful to Brown because it 
filled in some of the gaps in Brown‘s timeline.  For example, 
Detective McDermott stated that it took approximately 
twenty-two to twenty-three minutes to make the trip from 
TGI Friday‘s to the corner of Conestoga and Girard.  
McDermott also testified that the sun set on September 7, 
1998, at 7:23 p.m. and that the end of ―civil twilight‖ was 
7:50 p.m. 
But that evidence too was insufficient to establish an 
alibi for Brown.  Assuming Brown left the restaurant when it 
was ―dark‖ between sunset (7:23 p.m.) and the end of 
―twilight‖ (7:50 p.m.), he could have reached the corner of 
Conestoga and Girard in time to meet with Kareema Latimer 
shortly after 8:00 p.m.  If he left at 7:50 p.m. and drove the 
―twenty-two to twenty-three minutes‖ to the crime scene, he 
would have arrived between 8:12 and 8:13 p.m., eleven or 
twelve minutes before the murder.
5
  Witnesses testified that 
the shooting started sometime ―after five minutes‖ and 
perhaps ―fifteen to twenty minutes‖ later, estimates that are 
far from precise.  Even assuming that he left TGI Friday‘s at 
7:50 p.m., Brown could have been the shooter.  Moreover, a 
scenario in which he left as early as 7:23 p.m.—a full twenty-
seven minutes earlier—is consistent with the record, even 
after the evidentiary hearing. 
Despite the equivocal nature of this evidence, the 
District Court found prejudice and granted relief.  In doing so, 
the District Court gave too little deference to the 
                                                 
5
 The District Court neither accepted nor rejected 
Brown‘s self-serving testimony that he stopped at the auto 
store, and we need not consider it. 
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Pennsylvania Superior Court.  See Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 
786 (―The [court] appears to have treated the 
unreasonableness question as a test of its confidence in the 
result it would have reached under de novo review.‖).  The 
proper question was whether fair-minded jurists could agree 
with the Superior Court, not whether it erred in denying 
relief.  ―An unreasonable application of federal law is 
different from an incorrect application of federal law.‖  
Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1411 (citing Harrington, 131 S. Ct. 
at 785).  That is because ―[a] state court must be granted a 
deference and latitude that are not in operation when the case 
involves review under the Strickland standard itself.‖  
Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 785. 
The District Court concluded that ―Osborne‘s 
testimony, had it been presented at trial, would have 
corroborated the testimony of other witnesses that placed 
petitioner at TGI Friday‘s at a time when petitioner could not 
have been at the scene of the murder in time to consult with 
Kareema Latimer at approximately 8:00 p.m. or to commit 
the shooting before 8:23 p.m.‖  Brown, 2010 WL 2596900, at 
*18 (emphasis added).  As the Commonwealth argues, 
determining that Osborne‘s testimony placed Brown at the 
restaurant too late for him to be the shooter required the Court 
to draw several inferences in Brown‘s favor: 
Even without crediting [Brown‘s] testimony 
about the [ten minute] stopover, [Brown] would 
have had to leave the restaurant by 
approximately 7:45 p.m., a time within twilight.  
As Osborne testified at the evidentiary hearing 
that ―it wasn‘t light out . . . it was definitely 
dark outside,‖ a jury could have concluded from 
Osborne‘s testimony, had it been presented at 
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trial, that petitioner did not leave until twilight 
had ended, 7:50 p.m., a time when petitioner 
would likely have been unable to reach the 
scene of the crime in sufficient time to meet 
with Kareema Latimer.  The statement that it 
was ―dark‖ out also provides corroboration to 
Miller‘s, Bright‘s, and [Brown‘s] testimony at 
trial that [Brown] did not leave the restaurant 
until after 8:15 p.m., a time when it would have 
clearly been dark out. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Although the District Court correctly determined that a 
jury could have concluded Brown did not leave until after 
7:50 p.m., or even 8:15 p.m., the critical question is whether a 
reasonable jury could have concluded otherwise.  The sun set 
at 7:23 p.m., a half hour before ―twilight‖ ended and almost 
an hour before 8:15 p.m., the time at which the District Court 
assumed that it was ―clearly‖ dark outside.  The District Court 
provides no explanation for why it might not have been 
―dark‖ at, for example, 7:30 p.m., when Brown would have 
had enough time to drive to the scene of the murder, making 
the uncorroborated ten-minute stop along the way.  Kevin 
Johnson testified at trial that it was dark by 7:00 p.m., and 
Tiyana Miller testified that it was already dark when she and 
Lynnette Bright walked to the restaurant between 7:15 and 
7:30 p.m.  In fact, the sky could have been dark even before 
sunset because it rained shortly after the murder.  Brown has 
not, and cannot, present incontrovertible evidence that it was 
―dark‖ only after 7:50 p.m.  Though Osborne‘s testimony in 
some scenarios might suggest that Brown could not have been 
the assailant, several assumptions are necessary to reach that 
conclusion.  But ―Strickland places the burden on the 
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defendant . . . to show a ‗reasonable probability‘ that the 
result would have been different.‖  Wong v. Belmontes, 130 S. 
Ct. 383, 390–91 (2009).  Brown cannot meet that burden in 
light of the speculative and equivocal nature of the evidence 
of record. 
The District Court also emphasized that Osborne was 
the only disinterested witness who placed Brown at the 
restaurant.  Brown, 2010 WL 2596900, at *18.  In the District 
Court‘s view, ―[f]inding that there is no prejudice solely 
because the testimony would be in accord with the testimony 
of others and thereby ‗cumulative‘ is an unreasonable 
application of Strickland‘s prejudice prong when such 
corroborative testimony would come from a witness that a 
jury could find more credible than those who testified at 
trial.‖6  Id. 
                                                 
6
 The District Court concluded that ―the state courts 
applied a blanket rule that testimony which would mirror 
other witnesses was ‗cumulative‘ and could not be 
prejudicial.‖  Id. at *16.  We disagree that the state courts 
applied such a rule.  Brown‘s state habeas petition was not 
denied ―merely‖ because the excluded evidence was 
―cumulative.‖  Rather, it was denied because the evidence 
was ―merely cumulative.‖  Id. at *14 n.9 (―As an appellant is 
not prejudiced by the failure of trial counsel to present merely 
cumulative evidence, an appellant‘s claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel on this basis must fail.‖ (quoting the 
Superior Court opinion)).  In other words, the state courts 
reasoned that there was no prejudice because the excluded 
evidence did not add anything material to the existing record.  
Cf. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1410 (―The ‗new‘ evidence 
largely duplicated the mitigation evidence at trial.‖). 
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Yet even if Osborne would have provided more 
credible testimony than other witnesses who placed Brown at 
the restaurant, it does not follow that there was a reasonable 
probability that Osborne‘s testimony would have made a 
difference.  The District Court noted that ―such corroborative 
testimony would come from a witness that a jury could find 
more credible than those who testified at trial,‖ id. (emphasis 
added), but that does not mean that there is a reasonable 
probability that a jury would do so.  Speculation is not 
enough under AEDPA.  The Superior Court‘s determination 
must necessarily be unreasonable.  Cf. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 
at 1410 (―The new material is thus not so significant that, 
even assuming . . . counsel performed deficiently, it was 
necessarily unreasonable for the [state court] to conclude that 
[there was no prejudice].‖ (emphasis added)). 
Ultimately, the District Court reasoned that Osborne 
―could have corroborated large portions of [Brown‘s] alibi,‖ 
which ―placed [Brown] at the TGI Friday‘s at a time when 
[he] could not have been at the scene of the murder in time to 
consult with Kareema.‖  Brown, 2010 WL 2596900, at *17–
18.  Had El Shabazz presented Osborne‘s testimony to the 
state court jury, it might have agreed with the District Court.  
But it is equally plausible that Osborne‘s testimony would 
have made no difference.  Because AEDPA gives state courts 
the benefit of that doubt, the judgment of the District Court 
cannot stand.  See Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 780–81. 
VI 
For the reasons stated, we will reverse the judgment of 
the District Court granting Brown‘s petition for writ of habeas 
corpus. 
